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LIGHT, LESS-FILLING, IT'S BLUE-RIBBON!
Stephen F Ross*
For well over a century, the claimed desire of baseball owners
to maintain competitive balance has been a bugaboo used to
justify any number of restraints of trade that would be plainly
illegal in most American industries. For much of the sport's
history, observers might well see the claims as entirely pretext-
witness the New York Yankees' complete domination of the
American League during the middle part of the Twentieth
Century,' the combination of a rigid reserve clause with free cash
sales of players to wealthy teams before World War 11,2 and the
clubs' refusal to permit a return to historic revenue sharing of gate
receipts until recent years,3 to cite a few examples.
Recent efforts, however, cannot be explained entirely by a
desire to restrict trade. In 1995, owners agreed to a significant
sharing of revenue;4 in 2000, the Major League Constitution was
amended to specify that the Commissioner's historic and broad
powers to protect the "integrity of the national game of Baseball"
included the public perception that "there is an appropriate level
of long-term competitive balance among the clubs."5  Most
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., J.D., University of California
(Berkeley). The author wishes to thank the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and the
Cardozo Law Review for sponsoring the Symposium, and Jim Bronner, Jeff Mishkin, Matt
Mitten, Robert Schweppe, Charles Tabb, Spencer Waller, Paul Weiler, Andrew Zimbalist,
and several baseball executives providing off-the-record comments, for their insights and
disagreements in reviewing an earlier draft.
In the eighteen year period from 1947-64, the Yankees were the American League
champions on fourteen occasions. See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 2886-2903 (10th
ed. 1996).
2 See, e.g., LEONARD KOPPETT, KOPPETT'S CONCISE HISTORY OF MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL 177-78 (1998) (illustrating point with inability of financially ailing Philadelphia
A's to compete).
3 See JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL
523-25 (1994).
4 The formula was incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement ending the
1994-95 player's strike. See Basic Agreement between the American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and
Major League Baseball Players Association, reprinted in Jeffrey S. Moorad, Negotiating
for the Professional Baseball Player, in 1 LAW OF PROF. & AMATEUR SPORTS, at app. 5A
(West 1997).
5 MLB CONST., art. II, § 4. See Ross Newhan, In Bud They Trust, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
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relevant to this paper, Commissioner Bud Selig also formed a Blue
Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics to "study whether revenue
disparities among clubs are seriously damaging competitive
balance" and to "recommend structural reforms to alleviate the
problem."6
The Panel's Report represents an important and constructive
development in the continuing public conversation about our
National Pastime. A review suggests, unfortunately, that the men
of substance who drafted the report-Yale President Richard C.
Levin, former U.S. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell,
former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, and noted
syndicated columnist and baseball author George F. Will-appear
both conflicted and somewhat biased as to their mission. Should
they be aspirational in establishing a blueprint for how the game
should be reformed? Or, instead, should they limit themselves to
modest suggestions that might be accepted, or that might meet the
predisposition of their Panel's creator, Commissioner Selig?
While the Report calls for a massive increase in revenue sharing,
poor teams are simply "encouraged" to boost payroll expenditures
to make themselves competitive. A punitive payroll tax unlikely
to attract union support is included without a sound theoretical
basis for how such a tax will improve competitive balance.
Proposed changes in draft rules severely damage the interests of
amateur players, but rules that might hurt current owners are not
even considered.
This Commentary reviews the recommendations of the Blue
Ribbon Panel and, accepting the Report's perspective of
advocating the long-term interests of baseball fans,7 identifies
some important and positive contributions made by the Report.
Next, some significant flaws and shortcomings are discussed.
Finally, the Commentary suggests several practical reforms likely
to improve competitive balance which plausibly could secure the
support of the various constituencies of the National Pastime.
I. THE REPORT, AND ITS STRENGTHS
The rhetoric of the Report from beginning to end is focused
on competitive balance, which is defined as a structure that
26, 2000, at D1.
6 RICHARD C. LEVIN ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF
THE COMMISSIONER'S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL ECONOMICS 1 (2000),
available at http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue-ribbon.pdf [hereinafter REPORT].
7 See id. at 13.
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permits every well-run club to have "a regularly recurring
reasonable hope of reaching post-season play" ("RRRRPP").8
The Report acknowledges-contrary to the protestations of
owners over the years-that the dramatic introduction of
competition for players' services (free agency) resulting from the
Messersmith/McNally arbitration in 1976 actually improved
competitive balance in baseball.9 However, the Report suggests
that since the 1994 strike, competitive balance has markedly
declined, a decline that the Report attributes to the increased
payroll disparities between the clubs. By comparing payroll
disparities before and after 1994, the Report infers that
competitive balance can be maintained with a 2:1 ratio of
expenditures between the highest quartile of clubs and the lowest
quartile, but that the current 3:1 ratio results in dramatic
imbalance. It attributes this imbalance in turn to "a large and
growing" disparity in local revenues, and then relates its specific
recommendations back to a goal of re-establishing a 2:1 ratio of
expenditures between the big-spending and most frugal clubs.1"
To facilitate the goal of permitting every well-run team to
have a RRRRPP, the Report makes six specific recommendations:
1. Clubs should share 40-50 percent of local revenue;"
2. Payrolls in excess of $84 million (the figure will not increase
with inflation) are taxed at the marginal rate of 50 percent,
while all clubs are "encouraged" to spend at least $40 million;
12
3. Revenues gained through league-wide activities (network
television contracts, licensing, internet, etc.) should be
unequally distributed "progressively" to help poorer clubs, but
conditioned on the clubs spending at least $40 million; 3
8 Id. at 8. This is a great alliteration. It will remind antitrust cognoscenti of the
Department of Justice's merger analysis terminology for the focus, in market definition,
on whether a firm could profitably impose a "small but significant and non-transitory
increase in price." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Aug. 2,
2002). This became known as a "SSNIP". Competitive balance can henceforth be tested
by whether there is a RRRRPP (pronounced as "r-r-r-r-ipp" with a trilled r).
9 In re Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 101 (Dec. 23, 1975), an arbitrator interpreted the uniform player contract
that had been negotiated between the owners and the players' union to permit all players
to become free agents after a single additional "option" year of service with their
contracted-for team. This decision resulted in a new collective bargaining agreement
permitting unrestricted bidding for the services of all players with more than six years of
major league service. See MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE
SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 238-85 (1991).
10 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-7.
" Id. at 8.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 9.
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4. The Rule 5 draft-which allows clubs, for a modest sum, to
draft players not protected by being placed on other clubs'
forty-man expanded Major League roster but requires the
drafting team to keep the player on its own twenty-five-man
roster for the next season-would be modified so that the
weakest eight clubs would not have to keep a drafted player on
their roster;14
5. The Rule 4 amateur draft would be modified to cover all
international players (only North American and Puerto Rican
players are now subject to the draft), give more picks to
systematically poor clubs, and to allow the trading of draft
picks; 15 and
6. MLB policy should expressly permit franchises to relocate if
they cannot obtain a new ballpark (impliedly with significant
public subsidization).16
The Report represents a major contribution to the public
discussion of our National Pastime. Such a discussion is critical for
a number of reasons. Although the failure of Congress to overturn
baseball's judicially-created antitrust exemption cannot today be
attributed to "positive inaction" on the part of the legislature, 7 the
degree to which fans are unsatisfied with the conduct of baseball
owners can re-open the possibility of legislative reconsideration of
the exemption.'8 Similarly, as has been documented elsewhere,'9
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding its own
reconsideration of precedents suggests that evidence that a prior
ruling is "inconsistent with social welfare" could support creation
of new legal doctrine. If an enlightened public debate resulted in
widespread public awareness and support for, or opposition to,
baseball practices, this could influence the Justices as well. More
imminently, public perception has a indirect effect on the short-
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 10.
17 See Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive Restraints and
Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. L. REV. 133, 161 &
n.90 (2001).
18 The Report justifies the exemption as founded on the notion that it is in the public's
interest to have MLB as a national enterprise with orderly operations and a reasonable
degree of cooperation among the clubs, even if that cooperation is not strictly in
compliance with the pro-competitive policies that underlie the antitrust laws. See
REPORT, supra note 6, at 37. Because the Report's discussion of the exemption is an
aside, and among the drafters only Senator Mitchell is legally trained, perhaps the drafters
can be excused from their complete failure to identify a single aspect of cooperation
among baseball clubs that is both in the public interest and not "strictly in compliance"
with a current interpretation of the antitrust laws.




term future of baseball in the context of the pending labor
negotiations between the clubs and the Major League Baseball
Players Association: when the public supports management,
owners typically remain more resolute, while public opposition to
owners' tactics often softens their resolve and lessens the chance of
industrial warfare. Finally, even if there was no direct utilitarian
value to an intelligent public discussion of the problems facing
baseball, it is, after all, the National Pastime, and accordingly, the
Report's stimulation of discussion represents a net contribution to
the public welfare.
The second major contribution of the Report is its specific
and clear focus on competitive balance. Owners have often
obscured and conflated competitive balance with other goals that
are less likely to be attractive to the public and less likely to be
recognized by antitrust courts as legitimate. 0 The Report also
provides a clear benchmark-the RRRRPP concept discussed
above-as a measure of competitive balance. The Report
accurately identifies RRRRPP as the appropriate measure of
competitive balance. With disparate fan bases, and the general
national interest in creating dynasties to be maintained or brought
down, baseball fans would not prefer that each team, over a thirty-
year period, would win the World Series once and have a long-
term record of .500.1 Although the optimal level of balance
remains elusive, the focus on "regularly recurring," rather than
equal, participation in post-season play seems sensible. The
RRRRPP, which has its roots in antitrust jurisprudence,22 is
likewise superior to various statistical tests that academics often
use to measure competitive balance by focusing on the standard
deviation among clubs' winning percentages. The RRRRPP
correctly focuses on the need to maintain the interest of fans, so
that their favorite team is either a contender or so the famous
"Wait Until Next Year" headline is a realistic hope. It therefore
provides a coherent benchmark by which to evaluate various
proposals that result in trade restraints but which are justified in
some nebulous way as promoting competitive balance.
20 In the past, owners have sought to create "cost certainty" as well as promote
competitive balance. See Bruce Balestier, Affectionate Distrust Marked Drafting of NBA
Settlement, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1999, at 1, 8 (reporting that the league's goal for the
bargaining was "cost certainty"); Alan Truex, Owners Less Than Captivated: Players'
Proposal Lacks Cost Certainty, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 11, 1994, at 21.
21 This point was made at the symposium by players' union counsel Eugene Orza. For
a succinct debate, see Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 25,2001, at 31.
22 See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Higginbotham, J.) (stating that competitive balance
occurs when "each team has the opportunity of becoming a contender over a reasonable
cycle of years and a reasonable chance of beating any other team on any given night").
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Third, the Report's recommendation of up to a 50 percent
split of local revenues recognizes the current unfair distribution of
local television rights. Legal precedent vests the right to telecast
sporting events in the home team 3.2  The clubs have agreed,
however, that the visiting team may broadcast games back to its
home market, and that each club's home market is protected from
outside competition. In other words, the joint exhibition of a
Yankees-Twins game from the Humphrey Metrodome in
Minneapolis may be broadcast back to New York by the Yankees,
who recoup lucrative cable rights fees; in return, the Twins receive
the right to broadcast a similar game from Yankee Stadium back
to the Twin Cities. If this were negotiated as a bilateral barter
deal, the Twins' lawyer would be liable for malpractice. A scheme
whereby half of all local broadcast revenues was shared among all
members of the league will therefore not only increase the
financial viability of small market teams but is simply more fair.
The imprimatur of the Report is important for this principle
because, absent a legal challenge to the current scheme,24 any
changes in revenue sharing will require the voluntary agreement of
the owners or an extraordinary edict by the Commissioner under
his newly granted powers. Small-market teams used to have some
leverage in this regard, for the agreement granting television rights
to the visiting team was simply contractual; however, in return for
the modest revenue sharing currently provided, small-market
teams agreed to put this unfair barter-agreement in the MLB
Constitution.25
Part II of this Commentary details the conceptual and
practical flaws in the Report's specific recommendation that clubs
be encouraged to maintain a minimum payroll of $40 million and
23 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa.
1938).
24 For a discussion of a potential antitrust challenge to exclusive territories enjoyed by
large market teams, see Ross, supra note 17. For a discussion of a legislative proposal by
the Seattle Mariners' home-state senator to require revenue sharing, see 137 CONG. REC.
S13332 (daily ed. Sep. 19, 1991).
25 MLB CONST., art. IX, § 3. Why small-market owners behave as if they lack
significant bargaining power is unclear. In more competitive markets-college football is
an example-the wealthier or more successful programs can credibly threaten to re-form
conferences limited to top programs, because the economic rents that can be obtained by
these successful programs are simply based on brand loyalty. Large-market baseball
owners, whose economic rents are based both on brand loyalty and monopoly power,
would be at much greater risk if they re-formed a new baseball league limited to clubs in
the big cities. Such a league would certainly be viable in a competitive market, but it is
doubtful it could remain as the dominant league. It would immediately face a rival league
composed of all the small-market teams plus expansion franchises in the major media
markets. There is certainly room for an additional viable team in markets like New York
and Los Angeles, while there is no such room in Seattle and Minnesota.
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be severely taxed on payrolls exceeding $84 million. However, the
general objective of devising a plan that increases the payrolls of
weaker teams and dampens the payrolls of successful teams is a
legitimate one. The fourth important contribution of the Report
lies in its astute observation that a well-designed plan will not
necessarily result in an aggregate decrease in money devoted to
player compensation. The Report notes that a plan that imposes a
"competitive balance tax" on certain clubs with higher payrolls
and induces all clubs to maintain a minimum payroll will likely
cause the clubs with the lowest payroll to increase their
expenditures, while clubs in the middle "would be tempted to
increase payroll because they would have a greater chance to
compete with the high-payroll clubs." 6  Indeed, the Report's
insights demonstrate that a plan could be designed to improve
competitive balance and result in an overall increase in player
payroll.27 This is a promising insight, for it provides the basis to
design a plan that might actually be accepted in collective
bargaining, reflecting a coalition between the majority of players
who will benefit from the increased bidding by more clubs, and
those owners whose business strategy is to build the long-term
strength of the sport.
Those interested in our National Pastime will welcome the
Report's focus on competitive balance, recognition of the
26 REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
27 Economic theory predicts that, all else being equal, payrolls will be cut with revenue
sharing. Economists suggest that players are compensated based on their marginal
revenue product (MRP)--the amount of additional revenue that will be generated by the
player's addition to the roster. See, e.g., ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS:
A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 90-94 (1992).
If local revenue from live gate and local broadcasts were shared so that each team only
retained 50 percent of its revenue, then each player's MRP would be consequently
reduced by 50 percent. See Andrew Zimbalist, Competitive Balance and Labor Relations
in Major League Baseball, MILKEN INST. REV., First Quarter 2001, at 1, 12 [hereinafter
Competitive Balance].
Although this insight needs to be considered in designing a plan combining revenue
sharing and mandatory payroll minima, it should not be overstated. The simple version of
the analysis summarized above would suggest that there would be minimal bidding for
players in the National Football League, where almost all revenues are shared. Moreover,
sharing revenues in a manner that rewarded success (for example, by sharing each team's
broadcast revenue per game on a 50-50 basis with the visiting team) would minimize the
salary-depressing effect of revenue sharing.
Another means by which team incentives to spend money on higher-quality players
would not be diminished despite revenue sharing would be if a significant portion of
revenue was awarded as a prize for performance. For example, MLB could require each
team to put 50 percent of local revenues into a pool, that would be distributed, with 25
percent going to the World Series Champion, 15 percent to the runner-up, etc. This would
tend to equalize the incentives between large and small market teams. See Stefan
Szymanski, Competitive Balance and Income Redistribution in Team Sports (forthcoming
2002) (on file with author).
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unfairness in the current distribution of local revenues, and insight
that a well-designed plan can improve competitive balance without
restricting overall compensation for players. Perhaps the most
important contribution, however, only will occur if we take
seriously a rhetorical flourish in the first sentence of the Report.
The drafters style themselves as "representing the interests of
baseball fans." They assert that "the long term interests of the
fans are paramount. ' 28 The level of intelligent discussion about
the interests of fans is traditionally low-most fans have such a
strong identification with their favorite team that the result is
incoherent and hypocritical (such as Dodger fans who decry free
agency while preferring Kirk Gibson to Duke Snider or Willie
Davis as their all-time favorite center-fielder). If those concerned
about the public interest in our National Pastime seriously
consider the Report, the result will be a growing awareness of how
various ideas that are offered to benefit owners, players, or specific
clubs will indeed affect the public interest. Especially with the
erosion of the fiction that the Commissioner acts as a force
independent of owners to protect fans' interests, this public
awareness is essential.
II. SHORTCOMINGS
The Blue Ribbon Panel's Report was obviously and properly
designed for consumption by those in the baseball industry and the
general public, not as an academic article. Still, the intellectual
heft and background of the drafters29 creates a legitimate
expectation that the Report's specific recommendations will be
supported by rigorous analysis. Unfortunately, the Report comes
up somewhat short in this respect. Most importantly, the Report's
recommendations are almost entirely keyed to the drafters'
conclusion that restoring a 2:1 ratio of payroll expenditure
between the highest and lowest quartiles of teams is essential to
promoting competitive balance, yet the Report fails to coherently
explain why that ratio is so important. Another major
shortcoming is evident when the Report's six recommendations
are considered as a whole-it appears that the drafters have
attempted to straddle, in a biased way, their desire to offer their
28 REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
29 In addition to the general reputation for intelligent work deservedly held by Senator
Mitchell and George Will, Richard Levin has a doctorate in economics from Yale and
Paul Volcker's background includes a masters in political economy from Harvard and
graduate work at the London School of Economics. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 55-57.
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independent views on what would be best for baseball with a
desire to offer suggestions that are politically palatable to
important constituent groups. Third, although the drafters are
self-proclaimed advocates of the interests of baseball fans, their
Report exacerbates without meaningfully addressing the serious
general exploitation of fans and taxpayers through tax subsidies.
Finally, it is somewhat disappointing that a panel of economically-
sophisticated experts would simply regurgitate, without serious
analysis, the myth that fans forced to pay high ticket prices should
blame higher player salaries for their concerns.
A. Why Does a 2:1 Payroll Disparity Between Top
And Bottom Teams Promote Acceptable
Balance But a 3:1 Ratio Does Not?
Through graphs and well-written narrative, the Report seeks
to demonstrate a significant reduction in competitive balance after
the 1994-95 strike. The data presented seems to confirm the
drafters' conclusion that a significant number of teams do not have
the regularly recurring reasonable hope of reaching post-season
play that is important for the viability of these franchises and the
overall health of the game.3" Yet the Report's specific
recommendations are tied to the stated goal of returning to a
distribution of payroll expenses such that the average expenses of
the top quartile of teams is no more than twice the average
expenses of the bottom quartile. Unfortunately, the Report does
not rigorously examine why a return to this pre-1994 ratio achieves
the end goal of maximizing the number of clubs with a RRRRPP.
Specifically, the Report fails to answer this critical question: why
does a 2:1 ratio promote acceptable balance, but a 3:1 ratio does
not? Certainly, someone approaching this question with a fresh
mind might wonder how baseball was able to sustain competitive
balance with a persistent payroll disparity of 2:1 in the first place.
The success that baseball enjoyed as a balanced competition
despite this persistent imbalance in the two decades following free
30 It is important to acknowledge the point without overstating it. Fan welfare is
probably maximized when most clubs have a RRRRPP. For example, between 1950 and
1965-when the New York Yankees won eight World Series and thirteen American
League pennants, see THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 2889-2904--
attendance grew by less than 3 percent, although real ticket prices remained virtually flat
and real disposable income grew by 74 percent. See Competitive Balance, supra note 27, at
3. History demonstrates, however, that many franchises maintained at least minimal
viability while going for long periods of time without a RRRRPP. Symposium panelists
cited the Philadelphia Athletics and Washington Senators as examples.
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agency suggests something more complex than the truism of labor
economics that relative size of payrolls is crucial to competitive
balance. Moreover, there is some evidence that the Report's focus
on the 1996-99 seasons may not present an accurate picture of the
opportunities for low-payroll teams, in light of some of the
achievements by such teams in 2000 and 2001. Answers to these
questions are critical to an evaluation of any specific structural
changes proposed for baseball. The Report establishes
competitive balance as its goal and then, without careful
examination, makes a particular level of payroll disparity the
proxy for competitive balance.
There are a number of unexplored alternative answers to this
question, but these varied answers call for different policy
solutions. Back in 1992, economist Andrew Zimbalist observed
that payroll did not correlate well with performance: i.e., that
teams often spent money unwisely so that high payroll teams did
not succeed and low payroll teams did.' Similarly, economist
Stefan Szymanski has observed that the pay-performance
correlation is significantly lower in baseball than it is in English
soccer.32 One possible explanation for the post-'94 decline in
competitive balance is that baseball executives' ability to pay for
real rather than misperceived talent has improved.33 If that is the
case, restoring a 2:1 payroll ratio will not be sufficient, and the
Report's recommendations will not achieve their desired goal.
Another possibility is that there is a minimum viable scale
necessary to have a RRRRPP. Player personnel matters are an
inexact science, and a club's on-field success is a function not only
of the individual talent of the players but also coaching, "team
chemistry, 3 4 the avoidance of injury, and simply luck. Thus,
whether .a club's on-field performance will result in post-season
play is the function of a variety of factors so that, at most, any
given team has only a probability of post-season success. Perhaps
the resulting probability function decreases as payroll goes down
but disappears if payroll goes down too far. If this was true, then
what is critical is not the ratio between the highest and lowest
31 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 27, at 75-104.
32 See Stefan Szymanski, A Market Test for Discrimination in the English Professional
Soccer Leagues, 108 J. POL. ECON. 590 (2000).
33 The statistical correlation between pay and team performance was never significant
prior to 1995, but is statistically significant to the 1 percent level since then. Andrew
Zimbalist, Twins Shouldn't Be Exhibit A for Inaction, SPORTS Bus. J., June 11-17, 2001, at
46.
34 In this regard, current research suggests that teams with excessive intra-club payroll
disparity may perform worse on the field. See Lawrence DeBrock et. al, Pay and
Performance: The Impact of Salary Distribution on Firm Level Outcomes in Baseball
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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quartile of clubs but rather ensuring that the lowest quartile's
expenditures are simply higher. Such a conclusion would suggest
that the Report's recommendations for increasing the payrolls of
the bottom teams are on the mark, but those directing at
constraining the top teams are unnecessary.
As the drafters correctly observe, the evidence does not
support the conclusion that higher payrolls equal team success, as
any Dodger or Oriole fan can attest. The Report states that "a
high payroll does not automatically guarantee a good win-loss
record and a contending season, but a low payroll usually means
that a clubs cannot contend for a postseason berth or a
championship."35 Another explanation of why clubs with a low
payroll could contend where the ratio between their payrolls and
the most spendthrift clubs was 2:1, but not 3:1, is that the margin of
error is such that post-season success is going to be limited to those
with high payrolls. If this explanation was demonstrably true, then
a significant limitation on high-payroll teams becomes appropriate.
As detailed in Part III, though, such a limitation should be
targeted to teams with both high payrolls and success; there is no
legitimate reason to restrain high payroll under-achievers.
B. What Are The Causes Of Increased Payroll Disparity?
The Report is also unsatisfying in that it fails to explain what
might have caused the payroll disparity to increase from 2:1 to 3:1
in the period since the strike. Formulating a response consistent
with the goal of permitting RRRRPP for "well-managed club[s], '36
the Report seems to accept the conventional wisdom that
competitive imbalance is inevitable in an unrestrained market
because the large-market clubs will systematically have greater
revenues than small-market teams, creating a vicious cycle
permitting big-city clubs to spend more, thus obtaining yet-greater
revenues, while the small-market teams can spend less, preventing
them from obtaining revenues necessary to improve. Focusing on
local media rights as a source of imbalance, the Report notes that
"[n]o matter how well-managed a club might be, it cannot change
its media market rank."37  However, there is only a modest
correlation between media market rank and local revenues, with
Atlanta, Denver, and Phoenix in the top six and Detroit and
" REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
36 Id. at 13.
37 Id. at 19.
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Montreal in the bottom quartile.38 And it has been previously
established that, while winning and market size both positively
correlate to attendance, the elasticity of demand for wins varies
from market to market and across time.39  As a result, clubs in
smaller markets with fickle fans have a greater incentive to
increase payroll than clubs in larger markets with fans who may
enjoy the amenities of the ball park regardless of on-field talent.
Thus, it is not simply inevitable that large market teams will
prevail. 0
Symposium panelist Eugene Orza, the players' union counsel,
suggested that the 1994-95 strike caused greater economic harm to
the financially weaker clubs than to the wealthier ones, and that
this may have caused a short-term cycle that saw wealthy teams
able to increase payroll, and attract fans back to the ballpark,
while poorer teams had a much more difficult time with this
process. If Orza is correct, the necessary policy response is some
sort of short-term measure to jump-start the poorer teams back
into a cycle where they can have a RRRRPP, and thus prosper
financially, so that they have the means to invest in player talent,
rather than to implement permanent structural reforms of the sort
recommended in the Report.
The Report does not appear to consider the possibility that
the weak correlation between market size and local revenues
suggests that some of the clubs are "poor" because they are not
innovatively managed.4' To be sure, the drafters fudge this issue
by establishing a goal of ensuring that a "well-run" club has a
RRRRPP. But a report that states that long-term competitive
balance is essential for baseball, and claims to speak for baseball
38 Assigning half the population size to each club in metropolitan areas with two clubs,
the statistical correlation between media market rank and local revenues based on Report
data is .58.
31 See Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and
the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 563-64 (1997).
10 The Report's erroneous view that competitive imbalance is largely a function of the
different media markets in which clubs operate may be due to the drafters' demonstrably
incorrect assertion that in a free market, clubs would be clustered in a few large markets.
See REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. As competition in virtually every professional soccer
league in Europe (where clubs do not have territorial rights) demonstrates, large markets
do attract multiple teams but face significant competition from clubs from smaller cities.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence from England suggests that the largest markets are at a
disadvantage. Six major league clubs compete for the patronage of London's fans. The
dominant club in England is Manchester United, due in part to the fact that for a number
of years its one cross-town rival (Manchester City) fell out of the major league for a
variety of reasons.
41 The Report notes that Colorado is the tenth wealthiest club while a pre-expansion
analysis suggested that the Denver area was the weakest of proposed sites for relocation.
See REPORT, supra note 6, at 81-82; Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN.
L. REV. 643, 758 (1989).
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fans, surely falls short of the mark if it ignores a significant
minority of fans who must suffer with no hope of success "next
year" because of inept management.
C. Is The Report's Revenue Sharing Proposal
The Most Effective Solution?
Although the Report's revenue sharing proposal has much to
support it, the radical increase in shared revenue raises some
complex problems that authors of this stature should have
discussed. As noted above, the proposal to share 50 percent of all
local revenue can be justified both on grounds of fairness and
promotion of competitive balance. But there is also a
countervailing unfairness as well as an overbreadth to the
recommendation that the drafters do not consider. Although the
barter of television rights described above is unfair, this unfair
system has been capitalized into the franchise values of teams, so
that owners of franchises in larger markets pay significantly more
than those in smaller markets. If the Report's revenue sharing
recommendations were accepted, there would be an immediate
windfall capital gain to small market teams and windfall loss to
large market teams. The Report does not discuss how to deal with
this.42
On the other hand, concerns about unfairness and windfall
gains might be overstated. After all, despite widespread
dissemination of the Report, the grant of authority to the
Commissioner to unilaterally exercise his powers to improve
competitive balance (which clearly contemplates more revenue
sharing), and Commissioner Selig's proposal to the players' union
that includes substantial revenue sharing,43 a consortium of
knowledgeable baseball executives were still willing to offer over
$700 million to purchase the Boston Red Sox," presumably a team
that would be adversely affected in the short-run by revenue
sharing.
Moreover, if the primary goal of revenue sharing is to increase
competitive balance rather than to establish a more equitable
approach to broadcast rights, a targeted approach would have far
42 One possibility is to obtain an independent appraisal of franchise values and impose
a "capital gains exit tax" on the owners of small market clubs, upon sale, that would be
used to compensate the owners of large market clubs.
43 See Phil Rogers, Revenue Sharing Steps to the Plate; Involvement by Selig Seen as
Positive Sign, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2002, at Sports p.1.
44 See Meg Vaillancourt & Gordeon Edes, Baseball OK's Red Sox Sale Henry Gets
Team After Charities' Funding Boosted, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2002, at Business Al.
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less impact on the large market teams. How a radical increase in
revenue sharing between the top quartile teams and the middle-
tier clubs furthers competitive balance is not clear. Indeed, a
baseball executive affiliated with a large-market club has observed
that a scheme whereby the wealthiest teams shared revenue with
the poorest teams would require only half the cost of the Report's
proposal. 5
D. Other Than Revenue Sharing, Why Are Almost All Solutions
At The Expense Of Non-Owner Constituencies?
Although the Report's unsatisfying analysis of the precise
causes of increased imbalance may constitute its major
shortcoming, in several other ways the Report damages the
credibility of these respected drafters' claim to speak impartially
for baseball fans. Whether their call for a punitive 50 percent tax
on payrolls in excess of $84 million (a figure exceeded by seven
teams in 2001) is well-founded or not is a matter of legitimate
debate, but it is clearly aspirational in that it is unlikely that the
Major League Baseball Players Association would accept such a
proposal in the upcoming collective bargaining talks. Yet, in
several respects, the Report's astute observations about problems
solvable by recommendations that burden owners are softened,
seemingly to make them more palatable to other interest groups.
Most flagrant is that the proposal for the poorer clubs to spend
more money is precatory rather than mandatory, and set only at
$40 million. The $40 million figure is apparently derived from the
somewhat arbitrary selection of $84 million as the payroll ceiling
and the desire to restore a 2:1 ratio between the highest and lowest
quartile of teams. But it is not clear that, even with a 50 percent
tax, top teams' payrolls will not exceed $84 million, nor is it clear
(as discussed above) that simply restoring this ratio will accomplish
the Report's goals. Moreover, there appears to be absolutely no
justification (and certainly no explanation in the Report) for why
payroll minima should not be mandatory-other than the
perception that some owners will find it unacceptable.
In a similar vein, the Report correctly observes that current
rules permit the stockpiling of talented players in a way that
facilitates competitive imbalance. However, the drafters'
recommendations are limited to a significant expansion in the Rule
45 In light of the Commissioner's edict that any discussion of matters relating to
collective bargaining could result in a $1 million fine, see Steve Henson, Labor Daze, L.A.
TIMES, July 12, 2001, at D1, this not-for-attribution reference seems justified.
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4 amateur draft in a manner which harms players but imposes few
costs on owners, with only an extremely modest change in the
Rule 5 minor league draft that simply allows selected clubs to draft
a minor leaguer and not place the player on their own twenty-five-
man roster. The drafters do not explain how allowing the Expos to
draft a player from Columbus (the Yankees' affiliate) and assign
him to Ottawa (the Expos' affiliate) will meaningfully increase the
Expos' chance of a RRRRPP. Although a fuller and more
satisfying report may have explained this, the Report's credibility
is damaged when its solutions seem to be trimmed to primarily
affect interest groups other than owners. 6
E. Does The Report Speak For Fans Concerning
Ticket Prices And Stadium Subsidies?
Although the drafters' focus on improving competitive
balance is consistent with fans' preference for balanced seasons,
the drafters' credibility as advocates of baseball fans is most
severely tested in their treatment of fans as consumers. On the
one hand, the Report perpetuates the myth that the escalation in
ticket prices is caused by high salaries.47 Although this conclusion
is misguided, at least it shows a concern for fans. Particularly
disconcerting, then, is the Report's brief and off-hand suggestion
that baseball clubs be permitted to relocate when taxpayers will
not provide sufficient subsidies for construction of new stadia. 8 A
Report that seeks to credibly reflect fans' concerns need to grapple
with ways that needed stadium construction can be financed on a
more equitable basis. 9
High salaries do not cause high ticket prices; it is high ticket
prices that permit owners to pay high salaries. Although the need
to generate revenues to support a competitive team may explain
46 For a more detailed discussion of the Rule 5 draft, see infra text accompanying notes
71-74.
47 REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
48 See id. at 43.
49 For a comprehensive list of these subsidies, see Raymond J. Keating, You're Out!
Corporate Welfare for Major League Baseball, 91 TAX NOTES 1739, 1.739-1751 (2001).
The absence of any commentary in the Report on federal proposals to limit tax subsidies
for wealthy owners speaks volumes. Cf., e.g., Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace:
Franchise Free Agency in the National Football League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509-10
(1997) (discussing Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act, S. 1880, 104th Cong.
(1996)); Team Relocation Taxpayer Protection Act of 1996, S. 1529, 104th Cong. (1996);
see also PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE
SPORTS BETrER FOR FANS 263-77 (2000) (advocating federal intervention to prevent
stadium exploitation of taxpayers).
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the need for new stadia that permit revenue-generating luxury
boxes and corporate suites, the ticket prices charged for ordinary
seats is entirely a function of consumer demand for those seats.
Most games are not sell-outs; owners choose a revenue-
maximizing ticket price based on market demand. If payroll were
cut in half tomorrow, it is not clear why an owner would cut ticket
prices; conversely, if payroll were to increase by 50 percent
tomorrow, owners would not be able to make up the revenue by
raising ticket prices-if they could raise ticket prices without losing
revenue, they already would have done so.5 0 Higher salaries can
cause higher ticket prices in one particular respect, but this is one
consistent with the interests of baseball fans. To the extent that a
club's investment in a higher payroll results in a demonstrably
improved club, consumer demand for tickets is likely to increase,
which would allow clubs to increase prices. 1
Because a serious examination of the causes of the escalation
of ticket prices in baseball was apparently beyond the scope of the
Report, a full and original examination is likewise beyond the
scope of this Commentary. However, a few observations-
perhaps as an agenda for future study-are in order. Prices for the
most desirable tickets may reflect the combination of the increased
popularity and increased affluence of baseball fans, combined with
the increased marketing of season tickets to corporations to
distribute for business purposes. Higher salaries may be an
indirect cause of spurring baseball owners to hire front-office
talent better able to exploit the considerable surplus that
consumers previously enjoyed in the form of low ticket prices.
The explanation for the increase, even in the "Bob Uecker" seats,
must, however, be explained by increased demand.
Despite the important contribution that the Blue Ribbon
Report makes to the ongoing discussion about contemporary
issues in baseball, the Report leaves students and consumers of the
National Pastime unfulfilled in several important respects. The
Report fails to analyze convincingly why narrowing the payroll
disparity between the top and bottom quartiles of teams to a 2:1
ratio is the magic elixir for competitive balance. The Report's
-o In the decade following the introduction of free agency in baseball in 1976, average
salaries rose from $50,000 to $400,000, while the inflation-controlled price of a baseball
ticket actually declined. See WEILER, supra note 49, at 173. The owners were still making
money due to the substantial growth in attendance and related live gate revenues, national
and local broadcast revenues, merchandising, etc. See id.
51 Cf Red Smith, The Prophet of Doom Is Heard Again, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1980, at
E3 (describing how Phillies immediately recouped $800,000 salary paid to Pete Rose




recommendations puzzle the reader as to whether the
distinguished drafters are proposing what they think best for
baseball, regardless of its likely popularity, or are seeking, like
mediators, to forward proposals that might not offend key interest
groups. The Report encourages, rather than seeks to find a
solution for, the practice more prominent in other leagues of
franchise relocation to obtain publicly-financed stadia. Finally, the
drafters damage their credibility by rehearsing the myth that
player salaries need to be controlled for the sake of reasonable
prices for families to attend baseball games.
On balance, though, the Report remains a positive
contribution. The proposals provide the springboard for
alternative suggestions for reform that may achieve the goals
defined by the Report and may prove acceptable to interest
groups. Some of these are considered below.
III. SOME PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS To IMPROVE
COMPETITIVE BALANCE"
Whatever the shortcomings of the Blue Ribbon Panel report,
its goal of structuring the economic incentives in baseball so that
each club has a regularly recurring reasonable hope or reaching
post-season play (RRRRPP) is an admirable one. In this Part, this
Commentary offers five specific suggestions of reforms designed to
improve competitive balance. Major League Baseball should:
1) permit cash sales of players where the sale will promote
competitive balance;
2) impose a mandatory minimum payroll for almost all major
league clubs;
52 Although none of the proposals discussed in this Part are without controversy, as a
package all are plausible candidates for attracting sufficient support within the baseball
industry to be implemented. In a forthcoming article with Professor Stefan Szymanski, I
propose another more radical solution designed to maximize the competitive balance
interests of most fans. See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in
League Sports, 2002 Wisc. L. REv. 625; see also Stefan Szymanski & Stephen F. Ross,
Open Competition in League Sports (Soc. Sci. Res. Network, Working Paper 2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=243756. We suggest that
Congress or the courts require Major League Baseball to re-structure to permit new clubs
to join junior leagues, with the top finishers each year being promoted to the major
leagues and the worst teams in the majors being relegated to the junior leagues. Such a
proposal would increase competitive balance by providing a strong incentive for non-
contenders to increase their payrolls to avoid relegation. Moreover, to the extent that
certain teams are always dominant due to their exclusive or semi-exclusive rights to play in
a major media market, our proposal will break down this power by permitting new teams
to enter (e.g., in Brooklyn, New Jersey, the San Fernando Valley, etc.).
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3) restrain the ability of clubs with both extraordinarily high
payrolls and championship records to improve their club by
additional free agent acquisitions;
4) significantly expand the ability of weaker clubs to select
minor league players from stronger clubs through the Rule 5
draft; and
5) institute procedures to deter habitually inept management of
local franchises.
This Part explains why these proposals will achieve the
Report's goal of improved competitive balance and why the
impact that these proposals would have on important constituents
of the baseball industry suggests that a consensus could
potentially 53 emerge around them.
1. Cash Sales
One of the significant imperfections in baseball's labor market
is the fact that the rights to most players' services can be assigned
to another team only through barter-a "trade" for other
players-rather than for purely monetary considerations. This
custom, generally followed in the other major North American
sports, is a temporal and geographic anomaly. Prior to World War
II, the then-exclusive and perpetual right to a baseball player's
services was frequently sold for cash (most famously in the case of
Babe Ruth, sold by Red Sox owner Harry Frazee for cash needed
to finance a Broadway play).54 In the principal international
professional sport-soccer--clubs pay enormous "transfer fees" to
secure the rights of top players. Indeed, although European
players now enjoy even more generous free agency rights than
their North American counterparts following a 1995 court ruling,56
53 An outside academic, unfamiliar with important facts such as confidential collective
bargaining, in the context of an industry where decisions are made by strong personalities
that occasionally behave contrary to rational self-interest, would never predict that
proposals would in fact be adopted.
54 Mal Florence, Morning Briefing: Boston Will Never Forget, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3,2001,
at D2 ("On this day in 1920, Boston Red Sox owner Harry Frazee sold pitcher-outfielder
Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees for $125,000 plus a $350,000 loan. The loan was
used to fund the Broadway musical "No, No, Nanette," which became a hit."). Professor
Paul Weiler, befitting the politeness of his native Canada, notes that Frazee was motivated
by the desire to provide an artistic outlet for his "lady friend." WEILER, supra note 49, at
175.
55 See, e.g., John Ley, Zidane in £48m Real Deal, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
July 10, 2001, at 8 (discussing Real Madrid's payment of transfer fee for French
international star Zinedine Zidane and Manchester United's £28.5 million payment to the
Italian club Lazio for star Juan Sebastian Veron).
56 See Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Assoc. ASBL v. Bosman, [1996]
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players are rarely signed as free agents. Rather, the custom has
emerged that a club skeptical of its ability to re-sign one of its
players will sell the player with at least a year remaining on his
existing contract, thereby pocketing a sizable transfer fee. 7
Cash sales in Major League Baseball gradually disappeared
after World War II, but no formal rule was developed until the
celebrated case of Charles 0. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn.58 Charles
0. Finley, the irascible owner of the Oakland A's, had benefited
enormously from the reserve clause since he was both extremely
cheap (paying his players even less than other owners in a
monopsonized market) and a difficult owner with whom to deal.
He understood that star players would be highly unlikely to
remain with the team if given a choice, and so he agreed to sell
three stars to the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees in the
middle of the season, just before free agency was to go into effect.
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn exercised his powers to veto the
assignments as contrary to the best interests of baseball.
Whether most clubs have read that decision broadly to ban
cash sales or not, the fact remains that today there are virtually no
assignments of top-quality players in return for cash.
Commissioner Kuhn seemed concerned that cash sales would hurt
competitive balance, by permitting wealthier teams to buy the
good players from poorer teams. In reality, however, cash sales
can potentially benefit the less financially secure teams and
promote the goals set for in the Blue Ribbon Panel's Report. The
Rule 4 amateur draft gives less wealthy teams the opportunity to
develop talented young players on a fairly equal basis, 9 but recent
CEC (CCH) 38 (Dec. 15, 1995).
57 See, e.g., Gary Ward, Beckham Must Wait, NEWS OF THE WORLD, May 13, 2001
(reporting that if Manchester United cannot sign star midfielder to contract extension, the
club will sell him because "United dare not risk allowing his contract to expire in 2003 and
let him have a free transfer.").
58 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding power of commissioner). For a discussion of
the case, see ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 109-14 (1998).
59 The Report correctly notes that recently, shrewdly-advised amateurs have been able
to credibly threaten to exercise their options to of attend college, remain in college, or
play for an independent baseball league in order to increase their compensation, resulting
not only in huge signing bonuses but also in inferior clubs with the highest draft picks
passing over the best players to choose players they are more confident of signing within
their budget constraint. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 41. Some of the solutions proposed
by the drafters-such as requiring college players to give up their eligibility in order to be
considered by a professional team, and providing semi-permanent exclusive negotiating
rights for the team that initially drafts an amateur-seem unnecessarily monopsonistic.
Certainly the Report's proposal to allow clubs to sell or trade their draft rights, to
eliminate compensatory draft picks for teams losing free agents, and to eliminate first-
round draft picks for playoff teams, helps assure that the tailored, pro-balancing design of
the draft works as intended. Another non-monopsonistic reform would be to provide that
clubs unable to sign a high draft pick simply get an additional draft pick the following year.
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history is replete with examples of teams with outstanding farm
systems and great young players losing all of them, with virtually
nothing to show for their efforts. Imagine how a Pittsburgh Pirate
club faced with losing Barry Bonds, Andy Van Slyke, Doug
Drabek, and others might have maintained their ability to have a
RRRRPP if they could have sold the rights to two of their stars
after their fifth year in baseball, thus providing the funds to keep
one of the stars and continue to rebuild!
The ability of a less wealthy team to sell players for cash is
qualitatively distinct from the current practice whereby teams out
of contention for post-season play will, in late July, trade their
veteran players whose contracts are about to expire for low-priced
minor league talent. 60 In these cases, the trading team is often
primarily interested in saving the veteran's salary over the
remainder of the season. While some minor league prospects may
ultimately lift a losing team back into contention, there can be
little doubt that short-term competitive balance would be
enhanced by affording these lesser teams the opportunity to get
cash. Of course, lifting a ban on cash sales would not preclude a
clever general manager from trading for minor leaguers whose
long-term value is greater than cash.
Off-season cash sales will not only improve competitive
balance by providing revenue assistance and a fair reward for
poorer teams with excellent farm systems; it also will promote
balance by giving mid-tier teams the means to compete more
Competitive balance would also be enhanced by giving weaker teams more draft picks in
early rounds.
The Report proposes to subject foreign players to the Rule 4 draft without serious
consideration of the effects on player development. The Report expresses concern about
developing the game domestically as well as internationally, but fails to acknowledge that
the ability to reap the benefit of signing a young star is what creates the economic
incentive for clubs to invest in player development in those areas where local schools or
clubs are not up to the task. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 45. A draft may potentially
improve competitive balance when the effect is to give weaker teams the initial rights to
recognized high school and college stars in North America. Perhaps the extension of the
draft to cover Mexican or Japanese players, who would presumably be selected after
demonstrating their skills in their country's organized leagues, might have a similar
impact. Applying the draft to Dominican players, however, raises other complex issues,
similar to those involved with re-invigorating development of baseball in America's inner
cities. Unfortunately, the Report failed to consider alternatives such as maintaining draft-
free zones with baseball academies, but requiring that these academies be reorganized as
joint ventures with poorer clubs, or by providing that clubs that maintain baseball
academies in poverty-stricken areas without an established baseball infrastructure retain
exclusive rights to players subject to being selected in the first two or three rounds of the
Rule 4 draft.
60 See, e.g., Bill Plaschke, Arms Race. Those Giant Measures Expose a Fundamental
L.A. Problem, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at D1 (describing trade of starting pitcher James
Baldwin from White Sox to Dodgers for three mediocre minor leaguers).
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effectively against a dominant team. Consider the strategic
options that now face a good team that might finish seven to ten
games out, who might decide that with one additional quality
starting pitcher and a great lead-off hitter, they could seriously
compete for the championship. If, fortuitously, this club had
surplus talent in other areas, then they could consummate a trade
to fill their needs. Usually this would not be the case, and a trade
will simply result in filling one need while creating another. The
other option now available for such a team is to acquire a starting
pitcher and a great lead-off hitter in the free agent market. The
difficulty, especially for a team with a smaller revenue base, is that
there are very few top quality starting pitchers or lead-off hitters
that happen to be free agents in any given year. So the bidding for
these players can be prohibitive. On the other hand, if cash sales
were permitted, this team can look not only to the free agent
market but also every team in baseball for that quality player,
probably find such a player for a more reasonable price, and
improve their roster. 6,
One of the most important insights of the Batter Up!
Symposium was the view expressed by Major League Baseball
General Counsel Thomas Ostertag about the Commissioner's
decision challenged in Kuhn.62 In Ostertag's view, this was a very
limited decision, based on the Commissioner's view that the
specific transaction was part of a scheme by Finley to decimate the
team and pocket the money.63 Ostertag suggested that this ruling
would not necessarily preclude a cash sale under the two scenarios
outlined above. This is welcome news indeed.
As noted above, recent changes in the MLB Constitution
specifically define the best interests of baseball to include the
61 Any change in this custom would arguably relate sufficiently closely to wages and
working conditions that it would constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining with the
players' union. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 67
F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding NRLB determination suggesting that
virtually anything that relates to free agency and competition for player services is a
mandatory subject of bargaining). To assure union approval, this Commentary assumes
that the players' consent would be required for junior players. This is unlikely to be a
significant obstacle. In Europe, and most certainly here if implemented, the cash sale will
occur simultaneously with a new long-term contract with the buying club. For veteran free
agents, the right to assign for cash would simply be subject to any no-trade clause that the
player currently negotiates.
62 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). The reported decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals deals with the distinct legal question concerning the scope of the Commissioner's
power. The focus of the text here is on the Commissioner's underlying decision that the
cash sales were detrimental to the best interests of baseball.
63 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 9, at 377 (unfavorably contrasting Finley's acts with
those of Philadelphia A's manager-owner Connie Mack, who sold champion teams in 1914
and during the 1930s to allow himself to stay in baseball).
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public perception that "there is an appropriate level of long-term
competitive balance among the clubs. ' 64  In this light, the
Commissioner should clarify the issue by specifically stating that
the Finley decision will only be invoked hereinafter to preclude
those sales where the Commissioner determines, on the facts of
the case, that the effect of the particular sale will be harmful to
competitive balance. Specifically, the Commissioner should
indicate that he will approve cash sales where (1) the selling club is
unlikely to be able to sign the player to a long-term contract, and
has demonstrated that it will reinvest the proceeds of the sale in
higher payroll; (2) the sale transfers the rights to the player from a
winning club to a losing club; or (3) the sale is from a losing club to
a winning club but the Commissioner is satisfied that (a) the losing
club will reinvest the proceeds of the sale to improve itself and (b)
the winning club's acquisition of the player will increase
competition against more dominant rivals.
2. Mandatory Salary Minima
Although the Report fails to provide precisely the causal link
between payroll disparity and competitive balance, it certainly
seems sensible to target the low payrolls maintained by a number
of clubs as a cause of their inability to have a RRRRPP. Yet the
Report fails to precisely explain why $40 million is the appropriate
target for the minimum payroll necessary to compete viably. Even
more significantly, although the drafters state that "it is imperative
that enhanced revenue sharing be coupled with an appropriate
minimum club payroll,"65 the Report does not explain why a
variety of revenue sharing schemes should be used simply to
"encourage" these minima. It would seem that the Report's goals
could be better achieved by a more careful examination to
calculate the expected minimum payroll necessary to viably
compete, and then to require clubs to maintain such a payroll.
To permit flexibility in allowing a club to develop its team in
the most efficient way, and to make the rule consistent with the
goal of a "recurring" possibility of post-season play-rather than
the need to have every team viably compete every year-under
this proposal clubs should meet a specified minimum over a rolling
three-year period. Thus, a club could spend less because of an
extraordinary number of younger talented players on the team,
64 MLB CONST., art. II, § 4.
65 REPORT, supra note 6, at 38.
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with the expectation that the average would be achieved over
several years through salary increases and the acquisition of
veteran free agents when their contribution is more likely to result
in post-season play.
Every baseball franchise is located in a major metropolitan
area, so that a well-run team should generate sufficient local
revenue that, when combined with shared revenue, would permit
the team to viably maintain a minimum payroll of at least $40
million. It is conceivable that a team purchased on speculation of
continuously rising franchise values, combined with prior
mismanagement, might find itself unable to service a $40 million
payroll and the debt service used in the franchise's acquisition. If
so, the victims should not be local fans but the owners who
brought such mismanagement on themselves. If necessary, they
should be required to sell at a capital loss to an owner who can
guarantee that a minimum payroll can be maintained.
Alternatively, creative financial techniques-including
government investment in return for equity or creation of special
classes of stock for fans-should be used to provide sufficient
capital to permit continued viability.
3. Tailored Rather Than Blanket Salary Restraints
The Report's proposal for a 50 percent tax on all payrolls
exceeding $84 million is quite problematic. As a practical matter,
it is almost impossible to conceive of a scenario whereby the
players' union would accept such a proposal any time in the near
future. As an aspirational matter, the Report provides little
evidence that the very richest and most successful teams-the ones
whose domination causes the greatest threat to competitive
balance-will be sufficiently deterred by the tax to limit their
acquisition of player talent. If, indeed, a maximum payroll of $84
million is essential for competitive balance, then it is not clear why
the drafters did not propose a salary cap.
More fundamentally, the Report fails to accept that high
payrolls are a highly imperfect proxy for competitive ability. High
payroll teams-in recent seasons, most notably, the Los Angeles
Dodgers and the Baltimore Orioles-have been very
disappointing. Any "blanket" restraint like the one proposed by
the Report's drafters that fails to distinguish between these two
clubs and the New York Yankees and Atlanta Braves is simply
misguided. Although the Report acknowledges that the current
luxury tax does not meaningfully constrain the top teams, an
16972002]
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example under the current system illustrates the problem with
blanket restraints. In 1996, the White Sox signed Indians'
outfielder Albert Belle to a multi-year, $55 million contract,
resulting in a $3.5 million tax. 6 Why the White Sox should have
been discouraged from signing Belle (from the perspective of
competitive balance, at least) is hard to discern. After all, the
White Sox had suffered a loss in attendance in 1995, did not make
the playoffs, and finished 14 games behind the Cleveland Indians.
Signing one of the Indians' star players would seem to promote,
rather than hinder, competitive balance and thus should be
encouraged, not discouraged (unless the only consumers whose
welfare one is seeking to maximize are Indian fans!).
An alternative would be what tax lawyers might call a
"progressive salary cap." Such a cap would operate differently for
each team, depending on its record during the previous season,
with a "tight fitting" cap on the top handful of teams, a more
relaxed limitation on contenders, and no salary limitation on clubs
whose season ended before the opening of the Supreme Court's
annual term. One example of this type of scheme is the so-called
"Rooney Rule," which under the NFL's current collective
bargaining agreement comes into play if a salary cap is not in
effect.67 Under this rule, the top eight teams are limited in their
ability to sign a greater number of veteran free agents than they
lost from their own roster. 6 Unlike the salary caps in effect in the
NBA and NFL, this rule is tailored to promote competitive
balance. It restrains only those teams whose continued
improvement would actually jeopardize such balance, without
limiting franchises who, due to bad luck, poor personnel decisions,
or other factors, have high payrolls but poor records.
This proposal not only has the virtue of restraining repetitive
winners while allowing all other teams to improve but also has the
potential of receiving player support. Intensely competitive
professional baseball players-the majority of whom will never see
the benefits of free agency-are bound to dislike a system where
so many of them are consigned to clubs with no RRRRPP. Unlike
a blanket restraint, a progressive restraint will each year limit only
a small handful of clubs. Although it is conceivable that a few
select free agents might receive top offers only from these teams,
and thus would have their salaries significantly affected by a
progressive restraint, the overwhelming majority of players would
66 Claire Smith, In Baseball, Reinsdorf Smiles Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at
B17.
67 This occurred only during the first year of the agreement, in 1994.
(8 See White v. Nat'l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1413 (D. Minn. 1993).
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see unconstrained offers from clubs with increased revenue and an
increased chance at a championship.69
To illustrate one possible version of this proposal, even
accepting the $84 million figure proposed by the Report, three of
the seven teams exceeding that amount in 2001 did not appear in
post-season play in 2000 and thus would not have been subject to a
progressive salary restraint. To be sure, eliminating the Yankees,
Mets, Indians, and Braves from last season's free agent market
would have affected a few top stars, but the overall effect would
not only have promoted the interests of fans generally by requiring
these dominant teams to compete against improved rivals but,
when combined with increased revenue sharing and the likely
increased spending by others seeking to take advantage of the
handicap imposed on these teams, would likely have increased
aggregate player compensation as well. To the extent that baseball
salaries are significantly affected by a "trickle down" from the top
stars, it is noteworthy that of the eight players paid most highly in
2001, only two would have been on capped teams, demonstrating
the ample ability of other teams to vigorously compete for the best
talent."
4. Rule 5 Draft Changes
In 1954, the Brooklyn Dodgers lost Hall of Fame outfielder
Roberto Clemente in the Rule 5 Draft. Clemente was initially
assigned to the Dodgers' International League farm team in
Montreal, because there was no room for him on the fabled 1955
69 A generally unrestrained labor market is actually good for fans by promoting
competitive balance, in that it allows inferior teams to quickly improve. Ross, supra note
39, at 567-77. Why it might be in fans' long-term interests for player salaries to be
otherwise constrained remains perplexing. In a missive that parallels many of the Report's
recommendations, a noted sports commentator asserts without serious explanation that
"competitive integrity also rests on some form of upward limitation on players salaries."
BOB COSTAS, FAIR BALL: A FAN'S CASE FOR BASEBALL 87 (2000). Costas suggests
that, without these limits, competitive balance will be hurt by wild spending on superstars.
See id. at 96. As with the Report's drafters, he fails to explain why wild spending harms
competitive balance unless it is conducted by teams dominant on the field as well as in a list
ofpayroll expenditures. It may well be that union members who play baseball, like most of
their unionized counterparts in other industries, might choose to limit the salaries of the
top workers in order to more equitably spread the money available for player
compensation to others. This is an argument that Costas should direct to the MLBPA as a
matter of internal union management, not as part of his self-described "fan's case for
baseball."
70 The eight were Alex Rodriguez (Texas), Manny Ramirez (Boston), Derek Jeter
(New York Yankees), Jeff Bagwell (Houston), Carlos Delgado (Toronto), Roger Clemens
(New York Yankees), Mike Hampton (Colorado), and Kevin Brown (Los Angeles). See
Paul Sullivan, Craving Star Bucks, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22,2001, Sec. 4 at 1.
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"Boys of Summer." As a result, the last-place Pittsburgh Pirates
were able to claim him. 71 Today, the Rule 5 draft is riddled with so
many exemptions that the Dodgers would be able to protect
Clemente for some time. First, each club is allowed to protect
forty players from selection in the Rule 5 draft, rather than the
twenty-five comprising the regular season roster. Second,
unsigned free veteran agents whom the club fully intend to re-sign
need not be included. As a result, close to twenty players who will
not make a top club's twenty-five-man season roster, but who
theoretically could make a real contribution to another major
league club, are protected from the draft. Third, the club is also
allowed to protect thirty-nine players on its AAA roster. As a
result, someone who is perhaps the eightieth best player on a
dominant team cannot be drafted unless a weaker club is willing to
make the player one of their top twenty-five. Finally, there is an
automatic exemption for players that cover their first two or three
years of professional service. Although the latter exemption
reflects legitimate interests,72 the combined effect of all these
exemptions is to deprive the Rule 5 draft of its purposes of
discouraging stockpiling and promoting competitive balance.
The problem with the Rule 5 draft is not, as the Report
suggests, its stringent requirement that a drafted player be
retained on the twenty-five-man roster or be returned to the
player's initial club. Such a provision keeps the draft properly
focused on its goal, which is to avoid stockpiling. The real
problem is that wealthy and talented teams can stockpile players
that are not contributing to the team. The rule should be re-
designed with the goal that a player making a minimal
contribution to a champion can appear in the line-up, rotation, or a
key spot in the bullpen of an inferior team. First, we should return
to the half-century-old rule that allowed clubs to protect only the
twenty-five players on their in-season roster, including any veteran
71 Clemente was signed as an amateur by the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1954, and was
deliberately played in only 87 minor league games for their farm team, the Montreal
Royals of the Class AAA International League. He batted .247 for Montreal, and
contributed a mere two home runs and 12 runs batted in. The Dodgers' major league
roster for that year constituted the famed "Boys of Summer" who would win the 1955
World Series, and they left Clemente off the list. He was drafted for $4,000 by the last-
place Pittsburgh Pirates, for whom he started the following year (when they remained in
the cellar). See Trivia Quiz, THE SPORTING NEWS, July 22, 1991, at S22; Don Reed, Eye
Openers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 1992, at 2F; THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA
416,420 (Joseph E. Reichler ed., 7th ed. 1988).
72 This exemption appears designed to protect the initial investment in player
development. However, it has a potential for improving competitive balance as well.
Absent such an exemption, a talented and rich team might be able to take a chance on
drafting a young prospect clearly unready for major league ball from a weaker and poorer
team who cannot afford a place on their major league roster for such a player.
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free agent unless (like the NBA does) the club renounces any
interest in re-signing the player. Second, to prevent dominant
teams from storing a rising star on its bench for long-term use,
clubs should be able to designate five to eight players as "rising
stars" who would be further protected; however, the designating
club should be able to option such a player down to its minor
league club for only two years after an initial designation. Third,
the minor league roster size for purposes of the Rule 5 draft
should correspond to their usual operating size during the baseball
season. Thus, only twenty-three players could be designated for
the AAA roster. This would allow weaker teams to select players
assigned to dominant clubs' AA or A roster and retain them in
their own minor league system for training and development.73
The problem with the requirement that players be retained on
the drafting team's major league roster is not that this substantially
deters inferior teams from selecting stockpiled players but rather
that an inferior team might select a young, unready player with
great potential and simply allow him to sit on their bench for
several years rather than developing in the minor leagues.74 There
is no perfect solution to this problem, for there is no way to
objectively distinguish between a stockpiled minor leaguer who
can make a modest contribution on the bench of a non-contender,
and an experienced future star grabbed by a cellar-dweller because
a contending team can't afford a roster space for him. The "rising
star" exception suggested above reflects an effort to balance these
competing considerations.
5. Replace Inept Management
As self-proclaimed advocates for baseball fans, the Report's
drafters properly seek to respond to fans' desire to root for teams
that have a real chance to contend for the championship, and
where a season has been a disappointment in that regard, to have
73 It is true, as Spencer Waller explained to me in insightful comments, that the Rule 5
draft is underused because it is rare that a team is so inferior that a player in someone
else's minors can be immediately useful on its own major league team, but that is only
because of the assymetry that requires the selection of someone else's forty-first best
player on a team's top twenty-five. It should not be that unusual for a player who cannot
make a contender's major league roster to be able to contribute to one of the cellar-
dwellers.
74 A famous example of this phenomena concerned the 1950s rule that required clubs
to keep on their major league roster any "bonus baby" who received a signing bonus over
a specified amount. Thus, rather than receive close training and development, Sandy
Koufax spent his first two years sitting on the bench for the two-time league champion
Brooklyn Dodgers. See KOPPETT, supra note 2, at 237.
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real hope for next year. Yet the Report limits itself to those
reforms designed to allow "well-run" clubs to achieve a
RRRRPP.75 Other than trimming their sails to appeal to the
owners who created their panel, it is not clear why their Report
stops there. A team that has no hope of success harms local fans
and the overall attractiveness of the sport just as much when that
lack of success is due to inept management as when it is due to the
economic structure of the league. There is no reason why the fans'
interest in having each team have a RRRRPP should be frustrated
by inept management. Major League Baseball would therefore
demonstrate a real and credible interest in fans by instituting a
policy of centralized review of teams who, in the wake of the other
reforms designed to achieve competitive balance, repeatedly
disappoint their fans.
Baseball requires such an extraordinary review process
because usual market mechanisms are unavailable to protect the
public. In most other industries where firms enjoy considerable
market power, the firms are publicly traded corporations;
inefficiently run corporations are subject to hostile takeovers by
those who believe the firm's value would increase with new
management. In contrast, many baseball clubs are either privately
owned by individuals, closely held corporations, or partnerships; in
such cases, there is no market means to replace an inept owner.
Some clubs are publicly owned. However, a parent corporation's
primary interest (especially when, as is the case with the Cubs,
Dodgers, and Braves, the parent is a media company) may be in
achieving goals other than reasonably recurring post-season
success, so here too the market will respond only imperfectly to
operational efficiency.
Commencing four years after the implementation of reform
proposals, the Commissioner, acting under his powers to promote
competitive balance, should initially appoint a special outside
investigator for any franchise that has not appeared in post-season
play at least once in the prior four years. This individual, with no
current ties to baseball but with a background of credible
expertise, should have access to all of the franchise's business
records and to the complete cooperation of front-office personnel.
The investigator should quickly report back to the Commissioner
as to whether there are obvious and justifiable explanations for
this persistent failure-injuries, slow but rapid improvement,
narrow misses, etc. If no such explanations are readily apparent,
the Commissioner should then create an Inquest Committee to
75 REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
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fully investigate whether management failure has been the cause
of the club's poor performance and to make specific
recommendations. The Committee should include a
representative of fellow owners and the Commissioner, or his
designee. The club's owner would be required to respond to the
Inquest report and to make undertakings, indicating the steps to
be taken to remedy the situation. The Commissioner should
provide the club's fans with an opportunity to express their views.
In all likelihood (especially given a likely bias toward fellow
owners), the Committee would accept the owner's undertakings
and continue to monitor the club's progress.
However, if an owner's undertakings fail to achieve success,
or appear to the committee to be unlikely to achieve them, the
owner could be required to sell the franchise to more competent
ownership. For example, an owner who has wasted millions of
dollars with poor personnel decisions and then makes it clear that
he is unwilling to further invest in player talent and scouting might
be forced to sell following receipt of the Inquest report. Another
owner who demonstrates an inability to select competent front
office help, or to give baseball personnel the freedom to make
sound decisions, might also be asked to step aside. On the other
hand, owners with a credible plan to bring the team back to
contention-even over a three to four year period-would be
granted the leeway to do so. Finally, to protect maverick owners
against arbitrary actions to expel them, as well as to protect
baseball against costly and time-consuming litigation, any decision
by the Committee to require a forced sale would be subject to
binding arbitration.76 Evidence that a club's ownership structure is
subject to market forces, and there are market indicia that
replacing current management would not increase the club's
market value, would point strongly against the dramatic sanction
of a forced sale.
CONCLUSION
Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig took a constructive step in
creating a Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics, and the
distinguished members of the Panel have rendered an important
contribution to the ongoing discussion of our National Pastime.
The recognition that this discussion needs to include thoughtful
76 The arbitrator could also consider if the club's fate had been strategically sealed by
other owners anxious to remove a maverick. Otherwise, teams could, for example, refuse
to trade with an unpopular owner in the hopes of causing his expulsion.
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advocacy on behalf of America's baseball fans itself makes the
Panel worthwhile. The Report also makes an enormous
contribution by focusing the discussion on ways to ensure that all
clubs have a regularly recurring reasonable possibility of post-
season play.
However, in several important respects, the Report is
unsatisfying. Its reasoning lacks the rigor and comprehensiveness
one might have expected from such an expert Panel. The report
establishes payroll disparity as a proxy for competitive imbalance
but fails to provide a detailed analysis of causality in light of a
history of competitive balance despite disparity. Its
recommendation that weak teams be encouraged to increase
payrolls, while wealthy teams be punished for maintaining high
payrolls, harms the Panel's credibility as disinterested observers
and creates the appearance of bias in favor of owners.
Building on the Report, this Commentary suggests five
concrete and plausibly acceptable proposals to improve
competitive balance. Permitting cash sales of players subject to
the Commissioner's oversight, establishing a mandatory minimum
payroll at a level likely to permit clubs to viably contend for post-
season play, imposing payroll maxima only on dominant teams,
changing the Rule 5 "minor league draft" to limit the players on
top teams that can be protected, and establishing procedures to
reform or rid the industry of inept management, are all designed to
give observers of the game the same "hope" for the future of our
National Pastime that each fan perhaps will have, if these
proposals are implemented, each springtime.
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